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Rostow: Consequences

CONSEQUENCES
Nicholas Rostow

There is only one argument for doing something; the rest are arguments
for doing nothing. . . . [I]t is a mere theorist’s paradox that doing nothing
has just as many consequences as doing something. It is obvious that
inaction can have no consequences at all.

T

F. M. CORNFORD1

his article examines possible consequences of U.S. and NATO withdrawal
from Afghanistan, Russian annexation of Crimea and claims to territory
inhabited by ethnic Russian citizens of other countries, and Chinese claims to
control large adjacent areas of the Pacific Ocean. Fundamental principles of
world public order are at risk or directly challenged in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and
the western Pacific. They are not unique locations in this respect, but this article
is not a review of all aspects of U.S. diplomacy and policy or of international
relations since the end of the Cold War.2 The purpose here is to examine assumptions, highlight American national interests in these regions, and suggest options
for defending or advancing those interests. Events in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and
the western Pacific affect U.S. vital interests because, since World War II, the
American people have been united in support of the following propositions: first,
a repetition of general war among the great powers is to be avoided; second, the
United States and other great powers bear responsibility for preventing such a
conflict; third, rules of minimum world order support the effort to prevent world
war; and fourth, isolationism and indifference to international crises are not appropriate means for achieving the goal.
Whether as a new country or as a mature great power, the United States has
participated in international politics and pursued a grand strategy. Since World
War II the central theme has been to avoid nuclear war. Deterring and defeating
aggression was at the core of U.S. grand strategy as applied from Harry Truman
through Ronald Reagan, with some variations along the way, because the disastrous consequences of accepting aggression prior to World War II were vivid for
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postwar governments.3 Though determined to avoid nuclear war, paradoxically
perhaps, administrations in the immediate aftermath of World War II professed a
willingness to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, thus hoping to deter
aggression.4 As the Cold War evolved and knowledge and understanding of crisis
management in a nuclear age matured, American administrations and Americans more generally thought of nuclear weapons only as a weapon of last resort
in the most extreme circumstances of national defense, if usable even then.5 As
the leading great power during most of the postwar period, the United States has
viewed its strategy as a responsibility it must shoulder. As a result, Washington
has expended blood and treasure to maintain non-nuclear-weapons options and
to shore up an international order based above all on three principles set out in
the United Nations Charter: the sovereign equality of states, the prohibition on
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, and the inherent right to use force only in individual or collective
self-defense or pursuant to UN Security Council authorization.6 Since World
War II the international system has rested on these principles.7 It has been able
to contain unpreventable conflicts, thus creating a regime of minimum order.
Of course, during the Cold War the United States recognized the reality of a
divided Europe because successive American administrations and the American
people themselves almost intuitively understood that it might require world war
to undo it and that such a war likely would involve the widespread use of nuclear
weapons. The United States therefore adopted a policy and strategy of containment, preventing Soviet expansion in Europe and communist expansion elsewhere so as to preserve as wide a space as possible for democracy and economic
activity.8 The mix of means by which the United States and its allies implemented
containment included robust deterrence and willingness to fight to maintain this
regime on a global basis. The cost was high. Ultimately, the effort was successful.
Since the Cold War, the belief that the world now embraces the three principles at the core of the UN Charter has dominated the American approach to
international affairs and formed the basis for coalitions responding to crises in
the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa. Doubt about whether Russia and
China, for example, share the American view of the UN Charter has persisted—
sometimes in the foreground, sometimes in the background, but never absent.9
This article examines the consequences of American, Russian, and Chinese actions in this context.
Afghanistan’s significance for Americans primarily flows from the facts that Afghanistan was the command platform from which the 9/11 attacks were launched
and is now a source of the opium used to finance terror and, more generally, to
fuel the global narcotics trade. Russia and China, in contrast, are great powers
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6
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and have been rivals of the United States for most of the past seventy years. The
thematic continuity among these three cases concerns the kind of world in which
we live and may want to live and the impact on that world of U.S. action. The
process of deciding among policy options needs to include analysis of American
national interests—important and vital—and the nation’s role in the world. It
should be almost unnecessary to say that the requisite analysis and probably action may not be avoided.
U.S. interest in Afghanistan has been transactional, depending on others to
bring the country to Washington’s attention. After the Soviet Union invaded in
1979, the United States saw a need to ensure that the Soviet campaign did not
move into Pakistan and an opportunity to create a quagmire for Moscow by
providing the Afghan resistance with weapons and other assistance. When the
Soviets withdrew in 1989, the job was done. The conventional wisdom sees this
limited U.S. view of American responsibilities as at least partly responsible for
Afghanistan’s becoming a terrorist base. If we now withdraw all our forces from
Afghanistan and again turn our back on the country, will Afghanistan once more
become a haven for terrorists and others whose activities pose a direct threat to
the United States? What will other countries make of such American behavior?
Will they see it the way the U.S. government does, as of no strategic moment?
Will they regard this action as significant and somehow affecting their national
interests? Will Afghanistan become the place where India, Pakistan, China, Iran,
and Russia compete for influence? And what will happen to Afghans, like Afghan
women, whose lives improved because of the Western intervention?
And if Russia is in the midst of a campaign to reestablish, by hook or by crook,
the old borders of the Soviet Union, does that mean we are back exclusively in the
world of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue?10 Certainly President Vladimir Putin’s
language suggests that that in fact is the case and that he has no discomfort in
following Hitler’s example in 1938 of fabricating complaints by ethnic German
citizens of Czechoslovakia to excuse seizure of the Sudetenland region.11 Will the
United States acquiesce or even agree that larger powers have the right to control,
as contrasted with influence, their smaller or weaker neighbors and that concern
for international law and order constitutes a lesser interest? Are we prepared
to equate Russian or Chinese aspirations to their own versions of our Monroe
Doctrine, even though the original Monroe Doctrine was much narrower than
the Russian or Chinese iterations appear to be?12 Will we agree, for example, that
Russia has a bigger stake than others do in Ukraine and the former republics of
the Soviet Union and that China has title to the South China Sea? If so, should
we defer to Russia’s and China’s wishes, especially because Russia and China
possess nuclear weapons? And if we do, where does that kind of behavior end?
Are the stakes high enough that we, with or without partners, need to enforce
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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international norms that are part of the bedrock of order? If so, how do we do it?
What is the impact on our friendships and alliances, and does that impact matter
to us? And, if we do not want to give Russia and China free hands, what are our
options?
The international system consists of independent states that have delegated
certain powers to multilateral institutions like the United Nations without thereby creating a world government. The system does not manage itself. Left alone, its
tendency is to coalesce against the strongest member or members, which is why
attempts to achieve hegemony historically have failed. But the historical price of
preventing hegemony has been general war, which in a nuclear age is excessive.
Medium- and small-sized states watch what the United States does because the
United States has been the principal guardian of an international balance of power and order within which they could go about their business without excessive
fear. Therefore, the actions of the United States and other great powers matter;
they affect, for example, calculations about whether to obtain nuclear weapons.
For this reason, the 1968 British-Russian-U.S. guarantee of non-nuclear-weapons
states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons was so important to the willingness of states to forswear nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.13 Will governments take from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in Ukraine
and takeover of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia the lesson that they
need their own nuclear arsenals, in particular because of the failure so far (as of
writing, May 2014) to make good on the 1994 pledge (similar to that of 1968) by
Britain, Russia, and the United States?14 Or will they take the lesson that nuclear
weapons provide an effective shield if one is contemplating aggression? Or some
other lesson? The world has avoided nuclear war since 1945 with a handful of
nuclear-weapons states. Despite some theorists’ optimism that nuclear proliferation is stabilizing, no one really knows what the impact of a large number
of nuclear-weapons states will be, especially given that proliferation is outside
the protocols and systems for preventing the use of nuclear weapons developed
through years of intense effort by the United States and the Soviet Union.15 A
mistake in this area will ruin everyone’s day.
All of these questions require analysis if we are to arrive at an answer to the
fundamental question of (with a bow to Lenin) what is to be done.16 In proposing
answers, one should be mindful of costs and benefits. Too often in recent years
the United States has acted without regard to short-, medium-, and long-term
costs and has provoked international reactions as negative as if it sought hegemonic control in the same vein as Napoleon or Hitler. As a result, a number of
American officials have found those actions to be excessive in terms of results
achieved. The costs have taken political as well as monetary forms, as Putin reminded his Duma audience in a bitter speech on 18 March 2014:
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6
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Our Western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided
by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They have
come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can decide the
destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as they please: here
and there, they use force against sovereign states, building coalitions based on the
principle, “If you are not with us, you are against us.” To make this aggression look
legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions from international organizations, and
if for some reason this does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council
and the UN overall.
This happened in Yugoslavia; we remember 1999 very well. It was hard to believe,
even seeing it with my own eyes, that at the end of the twentieth century, one of
Europe’s capitals, Belgrade, was under missile attack for several weeks, and then
came the real intervention. Was there a UN Security Council resolution on this matter allowing for these actions? Nothing of the sort. And then, they hit Afghanistan,
Iraq, and frankly violated the Security Council resolution on Libya, when instead of
17
imposing the so-called no-fly zone over it they started bombing it too.

Truth was not the issue: feelings, nationalism, and desire to recover power and
territory lost (in Putin’s view) when the Soviet Union disappeared dictated the
move on Crimea, to be described in words as far from “aggression” as possible. U.S
policy was to blame for Russia’s predicament, and Ukraine’s actions—real, imagined, or invented—against Ukraine’s ethnic Russian and pro-Russian citizens.
Putin’s criticism of American actions and conceptions was not entirely without merit, although not in terms he would use. Whether in Afghanistan or Iraq,
whatever the legalities, the United States did not articulate to itself, much less the
world, focused goals. Rather, American and allied policy in Afghanistan and Iraq
suffered from diffusion of purpose, sometimes appearing to be without a basis
in the international law underlying the initial use of force in self-defense and/
or pursuant to UN Security Council authorization.18 The tone and tint of U.S.
speeches and diplomacy sometimes were as abrasive as Putin’s own.
AFGHANISTAN
In Afghanistan, the variety of U.S. goals makes forecasting the consequences of
ending American involvement at the end of 2014 or 2016 more complicated than
it might otherwise be. More issues and variables are in play than would have been
the case had the coalition’s mission been simpler.19 The accretion of goals brought
an increase in responsibilities. Prioritization became correspondingly difficult.
Yet, as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently wrote, “foreign policy
is the art of establishing priorities.”20
After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States determined that
the perpetrators had trained in and operated from Afghanistan, where their
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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leaders lived. No other government dissented from this analysis and conclusion.
President Bush demanded that Afghanistan turn over Osama bin Laden for trial.
Afghanistan prevaricated, which the United States found unacceptable.21 The
United States took military steps in exercise of its inherent right of self-defense
against Afghanistan to capture Osama bin Laden and bring an end to the use
of Afghanistan as a base for such terrorist operations.22 Again, no government
protested.
This U.S. action was consistent with the long-standing view of the internationallaw right of self-defense that victims have the right to use force against both the
attackers and, in certain circumstances, the places whence the attacks emanate,
even if not the same. Thus, when Article 51 of the UN Charter affirms the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence,” the affirmation includes the
right to use force against the perpetrators of a military act from a country about
which the country should have known and taken steps to prevent or remedy.
When the offending country is unable or unwilling to do so, the victim has a
right to use proportional and necessary force to bring the threat or use of force
against it to an end.23 In condemning the terrorist attacks of September 11th as a
threat to international peace and security, the UN Security Council “recognize[d]
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the
Charter.”24 This UN language meant that the Security Council recognized the
applicability of the right of self-defense in the circumstances of September 11th.
The United States intended its military action to contribute to the suppression of
terrorism. The international community, including Russia, led by Vladimir Putin
in his first term as Russia’s president, agreed.
A state will fight to defend a “vital interest.” The suppression of terrorism has
been a vital U.S. interest for decades. To advance this interest, the United States
has used force repeatedly, although it has not engaged in protracted armed conflict solely because of terrorism except in Afghanistan and Iraq.25 For example,
the 1986 Libya attacks were retaliation for Libyan terrorism in Berlin.26 The
United States attacked Iraq with cruise missiles in 1993 in response to an attempt
to assassinate President George H. W. Bush.27
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan commenced on 7 October 2001,
quickly chasing Osama bin Laden and the Taliban leader Mullah Omar into
hiding. The fall of the Taliban government provided the context for political
change in Kabul. Policy makers then began to add to the narrow military goals in
Afghanistan, on the ground that they were necessary if terrorists were not to resume the use of the country as a base of operations. They therefore did not focus
exclusively on training an Afghan army so that the national government might
hope eventually to obtain something like a monopoly on force and the ability to
secure the country against those who would use it as a terrorist base.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6

6

Rostow: Consequences

ROSTOW

47

Right after the 11 September attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Atlantic
Alliance to support the United States. This action ultimately led to the creation
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), blessed by the UN Security
Council, as the international military coalition in support of the Afghan government in its struggle against Taliban and other fighters at odds with the Kabul
government.28 The United States and its partners helped create and protect an
interim government and engaged in bringing cultural as well as political and
security change to Afghanistan. Nearly a decade after the terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington, UN Security Council resolutions reauthorizing ISAF
and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan routinely contained the following
language, which spoke to the magnitude and multiplicity of the missions: “Recognizing once again the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan,
reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance, human rights, rule
of law and development as well as the cross-cutting issues of counter-narcotics,
anti-corruption and accountability are mutually reinforcing and welcoming the
continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community
to address these challenges through a comprehensive approach . . .”29 In October
2001, the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, had specifically rejected a “UN
trusteeship in Afghanistan.”30 Yet the efforts needed to achieve these Security
Council goals would involve long-term commitments of troops, civilians engaged
in reconstruction of a state and society, and money. In this context, a decade
is short-term. Afghan history, culture, and character militated against success.
While a trustee might have looked forward to the long-term attempt to implement this agenda whatever the obstacles, the odds were stacked against success
for a coalition partner of the Afghan government because of, among other things,
different views of governance and lack of time.31
The NATO mandate, announced at Lisbon in 2010, for wrapping up military
operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014 emphasized the complexity and
importance of the task:32
Our [NATO’s] ISAF mission in Afghanistan remains the Alliance’s key priority, and
we welcome the important progress that has been made. Afghanistan’s security and
stability are directly linked with our own security. . . . We are entering a new phase
in our mission. The process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility and
leadership in some provinces and districts is on track to begin in early 2011, following a joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment and decision. Transition will be
conditions-based, not calendar-driven, and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAFtroops. Looking to the end of 2014, Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility
for security across the whole of Afghanistan. Through our enduring partnership with
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, we reaffirm our long-term
33
commitment to a better future for the Afghan people.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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NATO’s Lisbon Declaration reflects two different but not competing realities.
First, the United States and its allies wanted to assure the Afghan government
and people that the relationship would endure. Officials in Washington and Kabul remembered well that that had not been the case after the Soviets withdrew
from Afghanistan in 1989. Second, the Lisbon Declaration makes clear that the
international coalition work of building Afghanistan necessarily would continue
beyond the termination of NATO military operations at the end of 2014 and that
international assistance equally would have to continue. Unstated is the view that
Afghanistan will not be able to secure its future without such assistance.
NATO’s declared aspiration for Afghanistan includes far more than a central
army capable of controlling the country. It involves no less than the creation of
a state of Afghanistan as developed countries understand the concept of “state”:
a government with a monopoly on the use of force, capable of delivering fundamental services, including justice, throughout the country consistent with the
rule of law. NATO adopted this goal and more in its May 2012 summit, and a
month later several dozen countries committed themselves to high development
goals at the Tokyo Donors Conference.34
The possibility that political, social, and economic developments in Afghanistan may not meet the NATO timetable has been no secret. In international
meetings, Afghan officials have expressed their concerns about the durability
of national institutions without ISAF protection and support. Some have even
remarked that increased corruption reflected concern to provide for escape to
foreign countries in the event the elected Afghan government was not strong
enough to survive in a struggle with the Taliban. At the same time, NATO government officials seem to ignore the affirmation that “Afghanistan’s security and
stability are directly linked with our own security.” Such language suggests that,
above all, NATO and other forces are in Afghanistan to defend their respective
national interests. Do they really believe it?
Against this background, what are the foreseeable consequences of a withdrawal of all U.S. and NATO armed forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014
or even 2016? First, there will be no international force to continue to train and
support the Afghan National Army. Whether that army will be able to perform its
mission of maintaining the security and stability of Afghanistan against Taliban
and Al Qaeda fighters is a question for professional assessment and for testing
in battle. Some recent veterans of American military efforts in Afghanistan are
optimistic, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that one should not expect the
Afghan National Army, unassisted with materiel or advisers, to hold its own for
long against Taliban and Al Qaeda, especially if joined by regional leaders seeking
their own advantage vis-à-vis Kabul. Those veterans favor a modest ongoing U.S.
military presence coupled with robust support to the Afghan government. If the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6
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conventional wisdom is wrong, the United States and NATO will be able to point
with some pride to the hard-won achievement such an outcome would represent.
If, on the other hand, the conventional wisdom is correct, then ongoing conflicts among Afghan regions and warlords (sometimes allied with, and sometimes
aligned against, various Taliban factions), incursions by Afghanistan’s neighbors,
unbridled poppy cultivation, Al Qaeda terrorist training camps, and Islamist social
mores likely again will dominate Afghan life. We can anticipate that external powers
—India, Pakistan, Iran, and China (and perhaps a newly reenergized Russia)
—will vie for influence with which they could acquire what they think would
be a strategic edge in this regional game. Pakistan, India, and Iran may exert
influence through proxies, destabilizing a fragile Afghanistan. After withdrawal
from Afghanistan, American influence and prestige there will be minimal. U.S.
ability to play a constructive role to diminish the chances of nuclear proliferation
or conflict and maintain and improve relations with Pakistan, India, and China
will be problematic and beset by obstacles. Those countries will pursue their own
interests without regard to Washington. Despite the “rebalance” to Asia, the U.S.
disappearance from the Afghan scene will have a negative impact on American
interests in the rest of Asia, stretching from Singapore to South Korea. Having
seen the public alignment in 2010 of U.S. and NATO interests with Afghanistan’s,
Asian states may well draw the conclusions, not only that they may not count on
the United States in their estimates of future events and threats, but also that, going forward, they should ignore U.S. interests and protestations of interests. For
the United States, which has long-standing commitments to friends and allies
in Asia and which has fought four wars in Asia since 1941, this outcome would
represent a serious challenge to vital interests and ability to fulfill commitments.
Quite apart from having an impact on the American position in Asia, a U.S.
and NATO and possibly UN departure from Afghanistan foreseeably will have a
most deleterious effect on those who have benefited from the coalition and UN
efforts. Among them are a substantial number of women who again have been
able to attend schools and participate in the political life of post-9/11 Afghanistan. It would be a human tragedy—and one with strategic implications, given the
way Americans, NATO, and the United Nations think of themselves and portray
themselves to the world, and given also the challenge to “the West” represented
by Russia, among others—if the end of the U.S. and NATO military presence in
Afghanistan restored a society that has values so at odds with those the coalition
and United Nations brought there.35
Why does this situation matter to the United States? Governments and nonstate actors have always paid attention to credibility and reliability—in short, to
reputation. They base calculations of risk, cost, and benefit on them. Since World
War II, the United States has played a decisive and continuous, if sometimes
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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controversial, role in the creation and development of an international community. It has done so because of how it understood its own national interests. The
United States also has felt a general sense of global responsibility to use its power
to avoid or prevent a general conflict that could involve nuclear weapons. The
United States has seen this role as necessary to the regime of minimum world
order essential to strengthen peace. U.S. efforts in Afghanistan since 2001 are part
of this strategic tradition. Were the United States to wash its hands of Afghanistan, other countries likely would conclude that the United States had formed a
narrow role for itself in international affairs, a role inconsistent with its position
during and immediately after the Cold War and with the responsibility it bears
for helping the world avoid nuclear confrontations.
Ukraine and maritime issues in Asia raise questions about how to understand
the U.S. international posture, questions that total withdrawal from Afghanistan
would highlight. Would such a withdrawal mean only that the job is finished?
Or should it be understood that the U.S. posture really is what, for example, the
columnist Charles Krauthammer says it is: a rejection of the American role since
1945 in preventing international “chaos or dominance by the likes of China, Russia and Iran.”36 If this summary accurately describes U.S. policy, does it mean in
those regions the same as it does in Afghanistan, namely, that they have to get
along without the United States?
Afghanistan is not about to disappear as a source of issues and problems, no
matter what Washington may wish. The narcotics dimension of Afghan reality
escaped control by NATO and U.S. forces, and it will be an abiding aspect of
Afghanistan in international affairs in the future. The Afghan economy largely
depends on supplying opium to, principally, Europe’s heroin consumers. Other
states necessarily will concern themselves with Afghanistan in light of this industry. Some will try to profit from opium. Some will seek to use it as an insidious weapon against their enemies. Others will seek to limit the corrosive social
impact of narcotics. Even more than Afghanistan’s potential as a terrorist base,
Afghanistan’s continuing to produce high-quality opium likely will provide the
locus of Afghan interaction with the rest of the world in the twenty-first century, as it was in the latter part of the twentieth century.37 It justifies treating
Afghanistan as a strategically significant place, where law meets reality. For the
United States and Europe, therefore, containing the Afghan opium trade will be
an ongoing necessity. Opium means that it will not be possible to forget or ignore
Afghanistan.
UKRAINE
Despite the history lesson from Henry Kissinger in the Washington Post on 5
March 2014 and his persuasive advocacy of seeking and finding a way, given
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6
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geographical and historical realities, to accommodate both Russia’s long, historical connection with Ukraine and Ukraine’s aspirations to chart its own course,
the Russian posture on Ukraine puts the post–Cold War international regime
under a lens.38 Indeed, it may presage Cold War II, as Dmitri Trenin, director of
the Carnegie Moscow Center, has suggested: “This new conflict is unlikely to be
as intense as the first Cold War; it may not last nearly as long; and—crucially—it
will not be the defining conflict of our times. Yet, it will be for real.”39
On 27 February 2014, Russia seized Crimea by force and purported to annex
it on 21 March. The seizure took place four days after the Sochi Olympic Games,
which Russia had used to show off its modernity, prowess, and class. Now, Russia
occupies Crimea, a province of Ukraine, just as it does South Ossetia and Abkhazia, regions of the independent state of Georgia.
Russia’s action has political, strategic, and legal consequences and ideological aspects. Politically, at the least it raises a question about the safety of Russian
neighbors that are independent states yet not part of NATO. Are they fair game
for Russian coercion or expansionism? Will Russia test NATO by moving against
a NATO country with a significant population of ethnic Russians and able to
invoke Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance?
Strategically, not much has changed, because Russia already controlled Crimea
as a naval base through agreement with the government of Ukraine.40 Legally,
Russia has violated the bedrock international-law prohibition on the use of force,
becoming a belligerent occupant in Crimea in the process: “All Members [of the
United Nations] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes [set forth in Article 1 of
the UN Charter] of the United Nations.”41 Russia is unable to claim that it is acting pursuant to the one exception to this rule, self-defense under Article 51 of
the Charter:42 Ukraine has not threatened or used force against Russia. Russian
nationals are not threatened. The fact that ethnic Russians who are Ukrainian
citizens may want to become Russian citizens and take Crimea with them does
not enable Russia to meet the test of self-defense, however expansively interpreted to include anticipatory self-defense, as in the case of Israel’s war against
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in June 1967.43
The ideological aspects of Putin’s ambition ought not to be ignored; the world
has too much experience trying to understand ideologues who, ultimately, have
had to be taken seriously in their own terms.44 It bears watching to see whether
Putin’s Eurasian Union indeed proves to be the antidemocratic, anti-rule-of-law
collectivity observers like Timothy Snyder fear.45 If so, the likelihood of a new
version of ideological struggle, with elements akin to aspects of the Cold War,
should not be discounted.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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As of this writing, Russia has not invoked the right of self-defense as justification for its actions and has brushed aside other obligations, notably the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed on 5 December
1994 by the presidents of Russia and the United States and the prime minister
of Great Britain.46 The document is of singular importance, although it is not a
“treaty” as defined in either the U.S. Constitution or international law.47 Yet heads
of state and government do not often sign documents of this kind. It recalls—
indeed, it refers to—the 1968 declaration at the UN Security Council made by
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States in connection with
the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that they would unite to
ensure that the Security Council could take immediate steps to protect any nonnuclear-weapons state from attack or threat of attack with nuclear weapons.48
In the 1994 memorandum, the United States, Britain, and Russia committed
themselves to, among other things, respect the territorial integrity and political
independence of Ukraine, not to use or threaten the use of force, not to engage in
economic coercion, and to consult in the event of a question arising about these
commitments.49
Russia has violated each of these commitments, while saying that the 1994
memorandum is no longer binding, because Ukraine is no longer the same as
it was in 1994.50 This position represents bad faith and poor legal reasoning as
well as doubtful strategy: commitments do not change with governments unless
explicitly renounced. For example, Russia’s obligations under the UN Charter
have not changed because it was the Soviet Union that originally made those
commitments. The ongoing character of international obligations is even more
important where nuclear weapons are concerned, as any alternative destabilizes
the Non-Proliferation and arms-control treaty regimes for the whole world. In
addition, as a legal matter, Russia’s actions make Russia a belligerent occupant,
whose behavior is governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.51 The
Convention recognizes that a belligerent occupant has rights; it also imposes duties. Above all, occupation does not affect legal status.52
History is full of examples of states, including the United States, exploiting
their superior strength at the expense of weaker neighbors. The run-up to World
War II in Europe is much in people’s minds because Hitler used tactics similar to
Putin’s with respect to the Sudetenland.53 The question for the rest of the world
is what to do about it. Some share the view of Britain’s ambassador in Berlin in
the 1930s:
What is defeatism? Is it to say that war sooner or later between Great Britain and
Germany is inevitable? Or is [it] to say that peace can only be preserved if Germany
is allowed to become one of the satisfied angels? I believe the latter, she may never
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be satisfied but that is the risk we have got to face. I do not mean, when one talks of
satisfying Germany, giving her a free hand, but I do mean basing one’s policy towards
her on moral grounds and not allowing oneself to be influenced by considerations of
the balance of power or even the Versailles Treaty. We cannot win the battle for the
rule of right versus might unless and until our moral position is unassailable. I feel
54
this very strongly about the Sudeten question.

An alternative approach is represented by President Truman’s response to the
Berlin blockade in 1948 and French president Charles de Gaulle’s to crises over
Berlin in the late 1950s—a firm affirmation and defense of rights and insistence
that the United States and its allies were not to be bullied or successfully threatened with world war.55 Similarly, President George H. W. Bush and his allies
would not let Iraq’s 1990 attempt to annex Kuwait—Iraq’s so-called Thirteenth
Province—stand.56 Why did they care? They cared because they understood that
the most important foundation of minimum world order after World War II was
at stake and that to give in would not buy peace.57 The logic today is the same.
Putin’s Russia has used force to take control of two Georgian provinces and now
a Ukrainian one. The character of the Ukrainian government and its politicians is
irrelevant in this analysis.58 As President Obama said on 26 March 2014 Russia is
“testing . . . the international order that we have worked for generations to build
up.”59 The stakes could not be put more starkly, even though the president also
said Russia will not “be dislodged from Crimea or deterred from further escalation by military force.”60 He did say, however, that Russian isolation would deepen
and sanctions would expand should Russia stay on its present course.
To impose high cost on Russia would not be difficult, although for some it
might be expensive. Economically, Russia depends on the sale of its natural
resources, principally oil and gas, and access to international financial markets
to fund its budget and meet its payroll. The United States and its friends are in
a position, because they control enough of the world oil and gas supply, to drive
the prices of these commodities down. They could reduce or bar Russian access
to international finance and conduct NATO military maneuvers to reinforce the
impression of alliance unity in defense of the treaty area. The United States also
could start Russian-language broadcasts to the region providing alternatives to
Russian sources of news. Do the United States, its NATO allies, and closest international partners care enough to do so?61 They should. A third such Russian
territorial gambit will cost far more to undo or block, to say nothing of the costs
to law and order in the Far East if Putin’s Crimea policy is followed by copycats.
A deeply cynical alternative approach on Russia’s part would seek to exploit
Ukraine’s political and social culture. As in so many former parts of the Soviet
Union, including Russia itself, corruption, kleptocracy, and near bankruptcy
rather than real democracy, rule of law, and open markets have characterized
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Ukraine’s government since 1989. Russia may be content to see the United States
and its partners take responsibility for Ukraine’s economic performance, recognizing that for the foreseeable short term the costs, including the cost of Russian
oil and gas, will be enormous. This reality does not undermine the world publicorder impact of Russian action.
ASIAN MARITIME DISPUTES
The western Pacific washes the shores of Brunei Darussalam, China, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Each of these
countries asserts claims to islands, rocks, and surrounding water, together with
the land under the water. These waters see some of the world’s highest volumes
of commercial shipping and fishing and hold promise of great mineral wealth in
the seabed. In a rational world, these states would submit their competing claims
to a court for authoritative decision according to the international law of the sea,
codified in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which all the claimant
states are parties.62 The world is not so rational. It operates according to power as
well as law, and perhaps power more than law.63 The disputes in the western Pacific are political, geopolitical, and economic-political. There is no obligation that
the claimants submit to judicial or other third-party dispute resolution, although
they are obliged to settle their disputes peacefully. The situation raises profound
strategic issues and questions, not unlike those raised by events in Afghanistan
and Ukraine.
China, which has the most sweeping claims, including to most of the South
China Sea as if it were a Chinese lake, is unwilling to engage in third-party dispute resolution, insists on discussing issues bilaterally, uses the military instrument to intimidate and coerce its neighbors into capitulating to Chinese claims,
and seeks to avoid inclusion of the United States in any discussions.64 The South
China Sea is the region’s principal shipping route and source of fish, as well as
a potential source of natural resources, such as oil and gas. The United States
recently clarified its interest in the region and its position on the various claims
and disputes. On 5 February 2014, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel R. Russel
testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific on all the issues involved in the western Pacific maritime disputes. The
statement is of such relevance as to deserve extensive quotation:
I think it is imperative that we be clear about what we mean when the United States
says that we take no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land
features in the East China and South China Seas. First of all, we do take a strong
position with regard to behavior in connection with any claims: we firmly oppose
the use of intimidation, coercion or force to assert a territorial claim. Second, we do
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take a strong position that maritime claims must accord with customary international
law. This means that all maritime claims must be derived from land features and
otherwise comport with the international law of the sea. So while we are not siding
with one claimant against another, we certainly believe that claims in the South China
Sea that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed. In support of
these principles and in keeping with the longstanding U.S. Freedom of Navigation
Program, the United States continues to oppose claims that impinge on the rights,
freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea that belong to all nations. . . .
We are also candid with all the claimants when we have concerns regarding their
claims or the ways that they pursue them. . . . [O]ur concerns . . . include continued
restrictions on access to Scarborough Reef; pressure on the long-standing Philippine
presence at the Second Thomas Shoal; putting hydrocarbon blocks up for bid in an
area close to another country’s mainland and far away even from the islands that
China is claiming; announcing administrative and even military districts in contested
areas in the South China Sea; an unprecedented spike in risky activity by China’s
maritime agencies near the Senkaku Islands; the sudden, uncoordinated and unilateral imposition of regulations over contested airspace in the case of the East China
Sea Air Defense Identification Zone; and the recent updating of fishing regulations
covering disputed areas in the South China Sea. These actions have raised tensions
in the region and concerns about China’s objectives in both the South China and the
East China Seas.
There is a growing concern that this pattern of behavior in the South China Sea
reflects an incremental effort by China to assert control over the area contained in the
so-called nine-dash line, despite the objections of its neighbors and despite the lack
of any explanation or apparent basis under international law regarding the scope of
the claim itself. China’s lack of clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims has
created uncertainty, insecurity and instability in the region. It limits the prospect for
achieving a mutually agreeable resolution or equitable joint development arrangements among the claimants. I want to reinforce the point that under international
law, maritime claims in the South China Sea must be derived from land features. Any
use of the “nine dash line” by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed
land features would be inconsistent with international law. The international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim to bring it
in accordance with the international law of the sea.
We support serious and sustained diplomacy between the claimants to address
overlapping claims in a peaceful, non-coercive way. This can and should include
bilateral as well as multilateral diplomatic dialogue among the claimants. But at the
same time we fully support the right of claimants to exercise rights they may have to
avail themselves of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms. The Philippines chose to
exercise such a right last year with the filing of an arbitration case under the Law of
the Sea Convention.
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. . . [A]ll claimants—not only China—should clarify their claims in terms of international law, including the law of the sea.
In the meantime, a strong diplomatic and military presence by the United States,
including by strengthening and modernizing our alliances and continuing to build
robust strategic partnerships, remains essential to maintain regional stability. This
includes our efforts to promote best practices and good cooperation on all aspects of
maritime security and bolster maritime domain awareness and our capacity building
programs in Southeast Asia. The Administration has also consistently made clear our
desire to build a strong and cooperative relationship with China to advance peace and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, just as we consistently have encouraged all countries in
the region to pursue positive relations with China. And this includes working with all
countries in the region to strengthen regional institutions like ASEAN and the East
Asia Summit as venues where countries can engage in clear dialogue with all involved
about principles, values and interests at stake, while developing cooperative activities
—like the Expanded ASEAN Seafarers Training initiative we recently launched—to
build trust and mechanisms to reduce the chances of incidents.
To conclude, this is an issue of immense importance to the United States, the Asia65
Pacific, and the world.

This full and important statement of U.S. policy contains a number of points
worth stressing. First, the American interest in the western Pacific is “of immense
importance.”66 Second, the U.S. strategic interest lies in the maintenance and
strengthening of traditional alliances and partnerships, freedom of the seas, the
international law basis for maritime claims, mechanisms for managing confrontation and crisis, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Third, the United States
sees itself as a great Pacific power, with a vital national interest in peace in the
region. Inevitably, U.S. allies and friends are asking, can they rely as they have on
American security guarantees in an Asia in which China is the most powerful
state and is flexing its military muscle? A second question, which is beyond the
capacity of any state apart from China to answer, concerns China’s relationship
with the world. Is it along the lines Henry Kissinger described in the first part
of his book on China, seeking recognition of its centrality in traditional Chinese
terms of insisting on external forms of respect rather than domination or even
an active leadership role in the global system?67 Or is it more in line with the UN
Charter system to which China is committed, not only as a treaty party, but also
as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, willing to take on global
responsibilities and obligations?68
The South China Sea may provide an opportunity for constructive engagement with China with respect to piracy and other rule-of-law issues. The South
China Sea and its environs have a high volume of piracy. While some littoral
states, including China, may have citizens who engage in piracy or profit from it,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6

16

Rostow: Consequences

ROSTOW

57

Beijing probably sees it as a problem to be addressed. It may find solutions that
comport with international law more attractive in this area than with regard to
title to the sea itself. American diplomacy should explore this subject with China.
If China is attracted by a rule-of-law partnership against piracy, there might be a
diplomatic foundation on which to build with respect to sovereignty.69
A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES
U.S., Chinese, and Russian actions and inactions with respect to Afghanistan,
Crimea, and the South China Sea have consequences in the short, medium, and
long terms. It is imperative to analyze their significance. At least on the surface,
they raise questions about the degree both of consensus behind the post–Cold
War international order and to which defenders of that order immediately (and
will for the foreseeable future) understand that it needs defending, including diplomatically and militarily. Contrary to those who believe that force is irrelevant or
useless or unnecessary, successful diplomacy among the great powers has always
depended on the understanding that real military capacity and a willingness to
use it must back up words.70
In the case of Afghanistan, U.S. intervention and then more than a decade of
activity across a broad spectrum of governmental and societal functions have
profoundly altered the Afghan landscape in the name of a coincidence of American, NATO, and Afghan interests. Withdrawal in these circumstances inevitably
will raise questions about that coincidence of interests, unless it is accomplished
in such a way as not to jeopardize them. In this context, Afghanistan touches issues of world order.
Similarly, Russia’s seizure of Crimea challenges the norms of international
peace and security to which all states supposedly subscribe. Because of Russia’s
importance as a great nuclear power, Moscow’s actions have a much greater impact than a lesser power’s would on global order. The same is true in the case of
China.
China’s willingness to use its growing power to assert and defend maritime
claims having no basis in law challenges all states that depend on seaborne trade.
As one such maritime state, the United States inevitably sees its interests challenged. The challenge ought to be manageable, because every state knows where
uncontrolled naval competition can lead. How to manage the challenge is the
issue, one to be explored diplomatically in a range of capitals, not just Beijing.
The United States, Russia, and China ought to want a shared understanding
of fundamental rules of international order. Those rules are set out in the UN
Charter, although the Charter did not invent them. Actions implement those
rules and give them day-to-day meaning. It behooves the United States and China
to discuss how they understand Russia’s actions, how they would like to see the
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South and East China Seas operate, and how they would like to see the future of
Afghanistan unfold. The stakes are high. One interest the United States and the
Soviet Union shared during much of the Cold War was based on agreement that
the proliferation of nuclear weapons was dangerous. The taboo of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 remains stronger than many analysts believed
it would. But it has weakened since Pakistan, India, and North Korea became
nuclear-weapons states and may weaken further if Iran joins that club. This fact
should draw the United States, Russia, and China closer together. As long as disagreements about world public order persist, such coming together is unlikely or
at least extremely difficult to bring about. A breakdown in minimum public order
may make such a dream become reality. A French antiwar question in 1939 was,
“Why die for Danzig?”71 One hears the same question asked in connection with
Crimea or Moldova or any of Putin’s other targets or potential targets. World War
II was never about Danzig. The crisis Putin has provoked is not about Crimea or
Ukraine, any more than the fate of Afghanistan is exclusively about Afghanistan
or the crisscrossing claims in the western Pacific concern the rights of fish—the
issues involve world public order.

NOTES

Mr. F. G. Hoffman, Dr. Susan Koch, Dr. Wm.
J. Olson, Dr. Phillip Saunders, and Dr. Rick
Waddell made extremely helpful comments
and suggestions on an earlier draft. I alone
am responsible for the content. Interns in
the Institute for National Security Studies at
the National Defense University, Courtney
Lang and Brittany Porro, provided invaluable
assistance in preparing this manuscript for
publication. The views expressed are my own
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
U.S. government or any part thereof.
1.	The epigraph is from F. M. Cornford, Microcosmographia Academica (Cambridge, U.K.:
Bowes & Bowes, 1908), pp. 14–15.
2.	Thus, the Syrian civil war, whose significance
may not be underestimated, and other convulsions to which the United States has paid
attention from time to time are absent from
the article.
3.	Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May,
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986).
Also, for example, J. R. Tournoux, La Tragédie
du Général (Paris: Plon, 1967).

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6

4.	France’s President Charles de Gaulle made
France a nuclear-weapons state because—
among other things, including his view of
France and France’s place in the international
order—he thought it possible an American president might hesitate to use nuclear
weapons in fulfillment of the commitments
in the Atlantic Alliance if it meant possibly
seeing major American cities like New York
destroyed in response. See, for example, Jonathan Fenby, The General: Charles de Gaulle
and the France He Saved (London: Simon &
Schuster, 2011); Tournoux, La Tragédie du
Général; and Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The
Ruler: 1945–1970, trans. Alan Sheridan (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1993).
5.	T. C. Schelling, Controlled Response and
Strategic Warfare, Adelphi Papers No. 19
(London: Institute for Strategic Studies, June
1965).
6.	President Truman summed up the theme
of his first volume of memoirs as follows: “I
believe as I said on January 15, 1953, in my
last address to the American people before
leaving the White House: ‘We have averted

18

ROSTOW

Rostow: Consequences

World War III up to now, and we may have
already succeeded in establishing conditions
which can keep that war from happening as
far ahead as man can see.’” Harry S. Truman,
Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions (New York:
Doubleday, 1955), p. xi.
7.	Disagreements on interpretation and application do not detract from the centrality of
these principles.
8.	George Kennan, who conceived the containment policy, thought it would buy time for
the weaknesses of the Soviet system to force
fundamental change in Russia. See X [George
F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,”
Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947), pp.
566–82.
9.	For a penetrating critique, see Adam Garfinkle, “The Silent Death of American Grand
Strategy,” American Review (February 2014).
See also Henry A. Kissinger, On China (New
York: Penguin, 2011); Edward Lucas, The
New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat
to the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008); and Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of
China vs. the Logic of Strategy (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2012). Recent
Russian arms-control behavior reinforces
those doubts. They include reported violation
and circumvention of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, suspension of the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and
summary rejection of President Obama’s proposals for new strategic nuclear reductions.
See, for example, Michael R. Gordon, “U.S.
Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty,”
New York Times, 29 January 2014.
10.	Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian
War (New York: Penguin Classics, 1954), p.
402: “The strong do what they have the power
to do and the weak accept what they have to
accept.”
11.	See note 53 below. Timothy Snyder suggests that there is an ideological component,
consisting of elements of National Socialism
and communism of the Stalin variety, in
Putin’s thinking; Snyder, “Fascism, Russia,
and Ukraine,” New York Review of Books, 20
March 2014, pp. 16–17. The obvious danger
of historical analogies is that they use or
misuse history for current purposes; see, for
example, Bernard Fook Weng Loo, Historical
Analogies in Policy-Making: Crimea, World

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

59

War I and East Asia, RSIS Commentaries
63/2014 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School
of International Studies, 2014). But see C.
J. Chivers and Noah Sneider, “Behind the
Masks in Ukraine, Many Faces of Rebellion,”
New York Times, 4 May 2014, p. 1.
12.	The original Monroe Doctrine declared that
the United States would not tolerate any effort
by a European power to reimpose colonial
control on an American country that had
become independent. John M. Blum et al.,
The National Experience: A History of the
United States, 5th ed. (New York: Harcourt
Jovanovich, 1981), pp. 200–201.
13.	See notes 46, 48 below.
14.	See text at notes 46, 48.
15.	On why American decision makers favor
nuclear nonproliferation, see W. Seth Carus,
Nuclear Optimists as Proliferation Pessimists:
Why U.S. Policy-Makers Who Love the Bomb
Don’t Think “More Is Better,” (Washington,
D.C.: National Defense Univ., Center for the
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, in
press).
16.	V. I. Lenin, “What Is to Be Done?” (1902), in
Selected Works (Moscow: Progress, 1970),
vol. 1.
17.	“Crimea Crisis: Russian President Putin’s
Speech [of March 18, 2014] Annotated,” BBC
News, 19 March 2014, available at www.bbc
.com/. My Russian-speaking summer
research assistant, Daria Slepenkina, class
of 2014, University of California–Irvine,
finds that the English and Russian versions
of President Putin’s speech differ in interesting and important ways. Both appear on the
Kremlin website. The English translation uses
the phrase “rule of the gun” instead of “the
law of the strong” or “the right of strength,”
which are closer to the Russian original.
Putin’s Russian-language speech uses the passive voice when referring to U.S. actions. The
English translation uses the active voice, with
statements such as, “They hit Afghanistan,
Iraq, and frankly violated the UN Security
Council resolution on Libya,” whereas the
Russian version translates most accurately
to, “And then there were the instances in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and outright violations of
the UN Security Council resolution on Libya.”
In another example, the English translation
refers to the no-fly zone over Libya and states

19

60

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 4, Art. 6

that “they started bombing it, too.” The Russian version uses the passive voice: “bombings
began there, also.” The discrepancies between
the versions result in a more hostile, militant
tone in English than in Russian. The English
translation quoted here is at http://eng
.kremlin.ru/news/6889; the Russian text is at
http://kremlin.ru/news/20603.
18.	See Nicholas Rostow, “International Law and
the 2003 Campaign against Iraq,” in Issues in
International Law and Military Operations,
ed. Richard B. Jaques, International Law Studies, vol. 80 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College,
2006); William H. Taft IV and Todd F. Buchwald, “Preemption, Iraq, and International
Law,” American Journal of International Law
97 (2003).
19.	Mark Landler, “U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of ’16,” New York Times, 28 May
2014, p. A1.
20.	Henry A. Kissinger, “How the Ukraine Crisis
Ends,” Washington Post, 5 March 2014.
21.	George W. Bush, “Speech to Congress,” 20
September 2001, available at www
.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/.
22.	Ibid. On 14 October 2001, Bush reiterated
this position, saying, “If they want us to
stop our military operations, they’ve just got
to meet my conditions.” George W. Bush,
“Exchange with Reporters on Returning from
Camp David, Maryland,” 14 October 2001,
available at www.gpo.gov/.
23.	United Nations, Charter of the United Nations,
Art. 51. For a discussion of the international
law of self-defense and differing interpretations of Article 51, see Nicholas Rostow,
“International Law and the Use of Force: A
Plea for Realism,” Yale Journal of International
Law 34 (2009).
24.	United Nations Security Council [hereafter
UNSC], “Threats to International Peace and
Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” Resolution
1368, UN Doc. S/RES/1368, 12 September
2001, available at www.un.org/.

of the United States, Ronald W. Reagan 1986,
www.reagan.utexas.edu/.
27.	David Von Drehle and R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S.
Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush,” Washington
Post, 27 June 1993, p. A1.
28.	On 12 September 2001, NATO, for the first
time in history, invoked Article 5, the provision of the Atlantic Alliance providing that
an attack on a member constitutes an attack
on all members. Pursuant to this decision,
NATO allies flew AWACS radar aircraft
(large, sophisticated surveillance and aircontrol platforms) over the United States to
help secure U.S. airspace; see “Collective Defence,” NATO, last updated 14 January 2014,
www.nato.int/. ISAF operates in Afghanistan
pursuant to an agreement with the Afghan
government implementing UN Security
Council Resolution 1386 (2001), which
authorized the creation of ISAF as contemplated in the Bonn Agreement of 5 December
2001, on the future government of Afghanistan; Resolution 1386, UN Doc. S/RES/1386,
20 December 2001. U.S. armed forces not
assigned to ISAF operate in Afghanistan
pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense,
set forth in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
29.	UNSC, “Extension of the Authorization of
the International Security Assistance Force
in Afghanistan (ISAF),” Resolution 1943, UN
Doc. S/RES/1943, 13 October 2010, preamble,
para. 7 [emphasis original].
30.	In informal UN Security Council “consultations” (not an official meeting), attended by
the author.
31.	A knowledgeable official once said at the
National Defense University that the United
States had created a government in Kabul that
Afghanistan could not afford.
32.	In 2010, at meetings on the future of NATO,
observers spoke of the future, if any, of NATO
as tied to “success” in Afghanistan.
33.	“Lisbon Summit Declaration,” NATO: North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, 20 November
2010, para. 4 [emphasis added].

25.	See Rostow, “International Law and the 2003
Campaign against Iraq.” Without the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001, it is extremely
unlikely that the United States and others
would have invaded Iraq in 2003.

34.	The Tokyo conference pledged $16 billion for
civilian needs. Arshad Mohammed and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Donors Offer $16bln Afghan
Aid at Tokyo Conference,” Reuters.com.

26.	Ronald W. Reagan, “Address to the Nation
on the United States Air Strike against Libya,
Apr. 14, 1986,” Public Papers of the Presidents

35.	But see “Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of
the Afghan People,” Asia Foundation, 2013,
asiafoundation.org/. On the ideological

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6

20

Rostow: Consequences

ROSTOW

61

dimension of Putin, see Masha Gessen, “Sav- 		“Israel, with no strategic depth and facing
six divisions on its borders, mobilized its
ing the World from the West,” Washington
forces. It also asked the United States to fulfill
Post, 31 March 2014, p. A17.
the Eisenhower commitments of 1957 [to
36.	Charles Krauthammer, “Obama vs. Putin:
prevent any reimposition of a blockade of
The Mismatch,” Washington Post, 28 March
Eilat]. Being bogged down in Vietnam, the
2014, p. A17.
Johnson administration offered only to try
37.	United Nations, Afghanistan Opium Survey
to put together an international flotilla to
(New York: Office of Drug and Crime, Noopen the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping
vember 2013), available at www.unodc.org/.
from Eilat. The United States did not address
the Egyptian threat in the Sinai, and in any
38.	Kissinger, “How the Ukraine Crisis Ends.”
case showed little capability or will to break
39.	Dmitri Trenin, “Foreign Policy: Welcome to
the blockade of Eilat. After nearly two weeks
Cold War II,” Waco (Tex.) Tribune, 7 March
of uncertainty—with bloodcurdling threats
2014. See also Snyder, “Fascism, Russia, and
about the destruction of Israel coming from
Ukraine.”
Egypt and ineffectual efforts still under way—
40.	But see William S. Broad, “In Taking Crimea,
Israel launched a pre-emptive attack against
Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves,” New York
the Egyptian air force, destroying it in the
Times, 18 May 2014, p. 1.
first three hours of the war. In six days Israel
went on to defeat Egypt, Jordan, and Syria,
41.	United Nations, Charter of the United Naseizing considerable territory from all three:
tions, Art. 2, para. 4.
the Sinai Desert and the Gaza Strip from
42. Ibid., Art. 51, reads: “Nothing in the present
Egypt; the West Bank from Jordan; and the
Charter shall impair the inherent right of
Golan Heights from Syria.”
individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the 		Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside
Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New
United Nations, until the Security Council
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2004), pp. 21–22.
has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any times such action as
it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”

43.	Dennis Ross in 2004 summarized the run-up
to, and the unfolding of, the Six-Day War as
follows: “Nasser [president of Egypt], after
being taunted by the Syrians and Jordanians
for not doing enough to protect Syria in
the face of escalating tensions and military
engagements with Israel, demanded that U.N.
Secretary-General U Thant pull the UNEF
[United Nations Emergency Force, established in 1956 to separate Egypt and Israel]
out of the Sinai. U Thant complied. Nasser
moved Egyptian forces back into the Sinai.
While probably not originally intending to do
so, he acted to reimpose the blockade on the
Israeli port of Eilat when he declared on May
[22] that the Straits of Tiran were mined. In
addition, he moved six Egyptian divisions to
the Israeli border, threatening to inflict a final
defeat on Israel once and for all.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

44.	For example, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Hitler,
Mao.
45.	Timothy Snyder states that “any democracy
within the Eurasian Union would pose a
threat to Putin’s Russia. Putin wants Ukraine
in his Eurasian Union, which means that
Ukraine must be authoritarian, which means
that the Maidan must be crushed.” Snyder,
“Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine,” p. 16. See
also Michael Rühle, NATO Enlargement and
Russia: Die-Hard Myths and Real Dilemmas, NDC Research Report (Rome: NATO
Defense College, Research Division, 15 May
2014). Moscow’s arms control actions over
several years add to concerns over Russia’s
regional ambitions. In addition to testing at
least one new weapon system in violation
of, and another circumventing, the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
(see above note 9) in 2007, Russia suspended
implementation of the 1990 Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty, citing among other
things the “illegitimate” agreement requiring
it to withdraw troops from Georgia and Moldova. One year later came the military conflict with Georgia and the resulting expanded
area of Russian occupation. “Russia Should

21

62

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 4, Art. 6

Uphold Its INF Treaty Commitments,” Arms
Control Association, 23 May 2014, www
.armscontrol.org/.
46.	“Memorandum on Security Assurances in
Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, December 5, 1994,” UN Doc.
A/49/765, S/1994/1399, 13 December 1994.
47.	A treaty is a written agreement between or
among states; Sir Robert Jennings and Sir
Arthur Watts, eds., Oppenheim’s International
Law, vol. 1, Peace, 9th ed. (London: Longman,
1992), pp. 1197–1203. Under the U.S. Constitution, a treaty is made by the president with
the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate. While executive agreements and other
international undertakings made pursuant
to the president’s constitutional authority
set forth in Article II of the Constitution are
treaties for purposes of international law, they
are not constitutionally defined treaties. See
Robert Dalton, “Treaties and Other International Agreements,” in National Security Law,
ed. John Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner,
2nd ed. (Durham, N.C.: Caroline Academic,
2005).
48.	Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, “Security
Assurances Resolution Adopted by U.N.
Security Council June 17 and 19, 1968,” Department of State Bulletin 76, no. 1 (1968). See
also UNSC, “Question Relating to Measures
to Safeguard Non–Nuclear Weapon States
Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation,”
Resolution 255, UN Doc. S/RES/255, 19 June
1968, available at daccess-dds-ny.un.org/. Interestingly, Algeria, Brazil, France, Hungary,
India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union abstained, even though the Soviet Union made
an identical declaration to the one made by
the United States and United Kingdom committing themselves to expeditious Security
Council action in the event of a threat or
use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclearweapons states.
49.	“Memorandum on Security Assurances in
Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State.”
50.	“The End of the Beginning?,” Economist,
8 March 2014, p. 23. See also “Russia and
the EU Exchange Threats over Ukraine,”
Stratfor: Global Intelligence, 12 March 2013,

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6

which states, “Russia has threatened to use
powerful economic, political and military
levers to pressure the fledgling government
in Kiev and its European supporters” in order
to achieve a “long-term goal of ensuring a
neutral Ukraine, which it considers part of
its sphere of influence, as a buffer with the
European Union.”
51.	See Nicholas Rostow, “Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon:
Three Occupations under International Law,”
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 37 (2007),
pp. 205, 208–12.
52.	Ibid., p. 207.
53.	See, for example, Christopher Thorne,
The Approach of War 1938–1939 (London:
Macmillan, 1967); and Williamson Murray,
The Change in the European Balance of Power
1938–1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 170–263.
54.	Murray, Change in the European Balance of
Power 1938–1939, p. 167.
55.	Tournoux, La Tragédie du Général, p. 315.
(There would be no Munich—in response to
Khrushchev’s threat to operate on the “cancer” of Berlin.)
56.	See John Norton Moore, Crisis in the Gulf
(Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992).
57.	See, for example, “Kidnapped by the Kremlin,” Economist, 8 March 2014, p. 11: “giving
in to kidnappers is always dangerous: those
who fail to take a stand to start with often
face graver trials later on.”
58.	But see Stephen M. Walt, “Would You Die for
That Country? Why the United States Needs
to Think Twice before Calling Ukraine an
Ally,” Foreign Policy Voices, 27 March 2014.
59.	Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President
in Address to European Youth,” 26 March
2014, available at www.whitehouse.gov/. See
“Speech in Brussels,” Washington Post, 26
March 2014.
60.	Obama, “Remarks by the President.”
61.	On the crosscurrents and web of financial
interests making action against Russia painful, see Gideon Rachman, “Ukraine Is a Test
Case for American Power,” Financial Times,
10 March 2014.
62.	Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, United Nations Treaty Series,
vol. 1833, no. 39, available at www.un.org/.

22

Rostow: Consequences

For excellent overviews of the different claims
in the South China Sea, see (all in American
Journal of International Law 107, no. 95
[2013]): Lori Fisler Damrosch and Bernard
Oxman, “Agora: The South China Sea—
Introduction,” pp. 95–97; Zhiguo Gao and
Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South
China Sea: History, Status, and Implications,”
pp. 98–124; Florien Dupuy and Pierre-Marie
Dupuy, “A Legal Analysis of China’s Historic
Rights Claim in the South China Sea,” pp.
124–41; and Robert Beckman, “The UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea,”
pp. 142–63. Of course, judicial decisions take
place in a political context and are not immune to political pressures. On the political
context of international law, see Morton A.
Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, The
Political Foundations of International Law
(New York: Wiley, 1961). To the extent the
Convention on the Law of the Sea codifies
customary international law, all states are
bound; Jennings and Watts, Peace, pp. 25–31.
63.	International law is enforced in a multiplicity
of ways. Some might be slowing the processing of commercial documents, like bills of
lading, or identifying a sudden need to repair
canals. Others can involve noncommercial
mechanisms causing a state discomfort or
otherwise forcing it to comply with legal obligations and raising the cost of noncompliance
(which is what the United States presumably
is trying to do with respect to Russia’s seizure
of Crimea).
64.	Concerning the South China Sea as a Chinese
lake: “The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed
sea. . . . [Its width] is approximately 550–650
nautical miles (nm), and its length is 1200
nm.” Beckman, “UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the
South China Sea,” p. 143.
65.	
Testimony before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific: Maritime Disputes in East Asia, 5
February 2014 (testimony of Daniel Russel),
available at www.state.gov/.
66.	Ibid.
67.	Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), pp. 1–12.

ROSTOW

63

68.	Brahma Chellaney sees China as entirely
expansionist since the 1949 founding of the
People’s Republic, increasing its territorial
extent through “a ‘salami-slice’ strategy—
or what Maj. Gen. Zhang Zhaozhong of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) last May
called a ‘cabbage’ strategy. This involves asserting a claim, launching furtive incursions
into the coveted territory, and erecting—one
at a time—cabbage-style multiple layers of
security around a contested area so as [to]
deny access to a rival. The establishment of an
expansive air-defense zone in the East China
Sea is its latest cabbage-style security layer
move”; Brahma Chellaney, “Irredentist China
Ups the Ante,” Forbes, 2 December 2013,
www.forbes.com/. Robert Kaplan sees—
perhaps just because the Caribbean washes
American shores and is not too dissimilar to
the South China Sea in extent—an analogy
between China’s behavior and the dominant
position of the United States in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico; see Robert D.
Kaplan, “Beijing’s Caribbean Logic,” National
Interest, 25 March 2014. But the United States,
even during the Cuban Missile Crisis, has
never asserted more than its law-of-the-sea
rights.
69.	Patrick Warren, “The World Has a New
Piracy Hotspot,” Global Post, 27 March 2014.
See also Patrick M. Cronin, Cooperation from
Strength: The United States, China, and the
South China Sea (Washington, D.C.: Center
for a New American Security, 2012).
70.	See, for example, Henry Kissinger, “Force
and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age,” Foreign
Affairs (April 1956). See also idem, Diplomacy
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), which
discusses the role of military force in backing
up diplomatic maneuvers (for example, p. 39,
for Roosevelt’s “muscular diplomacy”). For
commentary on Putin’s gamble for Crimea,
see Robert Service, “Putin’s Czarist Folly,”
New York Times, 6 April 2014; Stephen
Sestanovich, “Putin’s Reckless Gamble,”
New York Times, 29 March 2014; Adrian
Karatnyky, “Putin’s Interference Is Strengthening Ukraine,” Washington Post, 13 March
2014; and Robert J. Samuelson, “Russia’s Big
Bet on Putinomics,” Washington Post, 3 April
2014.
71.	Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 573.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

23

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 4, Art. 6

Dr. Rostow is Distinguished Research Professor at
the National Defense University, specializing in international and national security law and affairs
and U.S. government and international decision
making in foreign and national security policy, and
Senior Director of the Center for Strategic Research.
In addition, he is a Senior Research Scholar at the
Yale Law School.
Prior to joining NDU in September 2010, Professor
Rostow served as University Counsel and Vice Chancellor for Legal Affairs and tenured full professor at
the State University of New York. His public-service
positions include General Counsel and Senior Policy
Adviser to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, 2001–2005; Charles H. Stockton
Chair in International Law, U.S. Naval War College,
2001; Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 1999–2000; Counsel and Deputy Staff
Director to the House Select Committee on Military/
Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of
China, 1998–99; Special Assistant to Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush for National Security
Affairs and Legal Adviser to the National Security
Council under Colin Powell and Brent Scowcroft,
1987–93; and Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser,
U.S. Department of State, 1985–87.
Professor Rostow has taught at the University of
Tulsa College of Law and the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy as well as the Naval War College.
He earned his B.A., summa cum laude, from Yale
in 1972, and his Ph.D. in history and J.D., also from
Yale. His publications are in the fields of diplomatic
history, international law, and issues of U.S. national security and foreign policy.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2014, Vol. 67, No. 4

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss4/6

24

